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Beyond Chicago: will activist
antitrust arise again?

BY ROBERT H. LANDE*

There is no need to document the revolution in antitrust that
occurred in large part as a result of the rise of the Chicago school
of antitrust and the Republicans' 1980 election victory. Now that
the Democrats are back in office a natural question arises: Will
there be a counterrevolution? What are the chances of significantly more aggressive antitrust in the near future?
This article will assemble a menu of relatively new ideas and
circumstances that could perhaps lead to an antitrust renaissance.
It will not revisit the reasons for the failures of past enforcement
initiatives;! nor will it discuss relatively "neutral" advances in the
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Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: I am grateful to Neil Averitt, Alan Fisher, James Giffm,
John Kirkwood, William Kovacic, and Howard Marvel for extremely useful suggestions, and to Alexander Baehr and Jack Merritt for excellent
research assistance.

The last time the Democrats controlled the presidency their antitrust appointees initiated or continued such doomed initiatives as no-fault
monopolization, shared monopoly, and conglomerate merger cases. The
author was an attorney at the Federal Trade Commission from 1978 to
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field that will not necessarily lead to a greater or lesser number of
cases. 2 Instead, this article will supply a list of possibilities that
could conceivably contribute to an antitrust resurgence. It will
begin by discussing some ideas and conditions that largely were
not available to previous Democratic administrations. The article
will then present many of the reasons behind antitrust's long
decline. It will conclude by attempting to balance these competing
tendencies to determine whether a counterrevolution is likely.

1984, and every case that he worked on there was unsuccessful. This is
almost certainly not due entirely to the author's own ineptitude, and he
hopes that the new enforcers will not repeat the Carter administration's
mistakes. For discussions of these enforcement initiatives see Robert
Pitofsky, Symposium: Anticipating Antitrust's Centennial: Comment:
Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CAL. L. REv. 817, 828-29 (1987);
Donald F. Turner, Symposium: Anticipating Antitrust's Centennial: Comment: Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CAL. L. REv. 797, 807, (1987);
Andrew F. Popper, The Antitrust System: An Impediment to the Development ofNegotiation Models, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 283, 311 (1983).
2
Among the large number of significant advances in recent years
that are not necessarily proenforcement or anti enforcement are: 1. The
development of new econometric techniques for defining markets and
measuring market power. See Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy Bresnahan,
Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market Power,
61 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (1992). 2. There is today a greater appreciation
for innovation as opposed to static efficiency. See ANTrrRUST, INNOVATION,
AND COMPETlTlVENESS (Thomas A. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992.
3. There is now a greater understanding of the motives underlying business behavior. Compare, for example, our current understanding of the
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of vertical restraints with the
state of knowledge of the field in 1976. See, e.g., Alan A. Fisher et aI.,
Do the DOJ Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance? 32
ANrrrRusT BULL. 609 (1987); IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION'S VERTICAL REsTRAINTS CASES (Ronald N. Lafferty et aI., eds.,
Federal Trade Commission Publication 1984), reprinted in 19 JOURNAL OF
REPRINTS FOR ANrrrRUST LAW & ECON. No.2 (1989); THOMAS OVERSTREEr,
REsALE PRICE MAlNrENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
(Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, 1983).
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Four relatively new ideas that could help fuel
an antitrust renaissance

A new Democratic administration and plaintiffs' attorneys
could search for theories that might help to revitalize antitrust.
Although there is no end to possible candidates, four appear most
promising. The first is the "raising someone's costs" idea. The
second reinterprets the overall goals of antitrust and incorporates
wealth transfer concerns (in addition to efficiency concerns). The
third involves the effects of imperfect information on firm and
consumer behavior. The last involves the application of strategic
behavior theory to antitrust.
A. The "raising someone's costs" concept
The concept of "raising someone's costs" is an appropriate
starting point because it is the most prominent of the relatively
new ideas that have emerged in recent years. This article will use
the term "raising someone's costs" rather than "raising rivals'
costs" in order to encompass a broad cluster of related activities
that sometimes can be anticompetitive. 3 First, activity can be anticompetitive if it raises rivals' costs in any of a number of ways,
including an increase in rivals' absolute costs, relative costs,
marginal costs, fixed costs, actual costs, or potential costs. 4 Second, firms can raise consumers' search costs, or sellers' selling
costs, in a manner that can be anticompetitive. s Third, firms can
3
There are, of course, activities that a firm can undertake to raise
others' costs, such as innovation, that are unquestionably pro competitive.
See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE LJ.
209 (1986).

4
These cost increases can affect targeted rivals or entire markets.
For an excellent analysis of these possibilities see John E. Lopatka,
Antitrust and Professional Rules: A Framework for Analysis, 28 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 301 (1991).
S
See Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, 111 F.T.C. 417 (1989), af!'d in
part and remanded, 955 F.2d 457 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 461
(1992) (Auto dealers agreed to restrict their hours of operation. This
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raise the costs of third parties, in related markets, in an anticompetitive fashion. 6
The raising someone's costs concept describes how rivals
can be harmed even in the absence of traditional price predation. 7
It can be applied in a variety of contexts. Not only can it affect
Sherman Act section 2 monopolization cases and give standing to
competitors in horizontal merger cases, but it can also affect horizontal restraint, vertical restraint and vertical merger analysis. 8
It is not, of course, a totally new concept. Any boycott case, for
example, can be considered as resting on a theory of raising
rivals' costs. It is nevertheless an idea that was substantially
developed by Dr. Steven Salop and others during the last decade. 9
The idea certainly was used during the 1980s.10 Many Reagan and
Bush administration antitrust enforcement officials were skeptical
that these situations could ever be anticompetitivel l unless the
increased consumers' search costs and made consumers less likely to
shop vigorously for the best price.).
6
See FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
(Dentists conspired to refuse to supply xrays to insurance companies.
This had the effect of making it more difficult for the insurance companies to determine that certain procedures might have been unnecessary.).

7

See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 3.

8

See id.

9
ld. See also Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and
Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 2412 (1987) for analysis
and additional citations.

10
James Langenfeld and Louis Silvia found that the majority of Federal Trade Commission horizontal restraint cases during the 1980s can
best be explained by some cost raising theory, as opposed to normal collusion or predation. They introduce the term "raising own costs" as a
label for many of these cases. See James L. Langenfeld & Louis Silvia,
Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Restraint Cases: An Economic
Perspective, 61 .ANrrrn.usr LJ. 653, 655 (1993).
11
For example, the Bush administration antitrust enforcers declined
to include the concept in the 1992 Federal Merger Guidelines. See 1992
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Merger
Guidelines, reprinted in 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) (Special
Supp., April 2, 1992).
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government was involved,12 however, so aggressive enforcers
could utilize this framework even more in the future.

B. Wealth transfers as a goal of antitrust
A second new idea is the belief that wealth transfers are an
important concern of antitrust. Before the 1980s antitrust was
generally thought to serve a variety of social, political and moral
objectives.t3 Part of the Chicago school revolution was to replace
this belief structure with the narrow view that efficiency is the
only original and legitimate concern of antitrust. 14 Now a third
possibility exists. 1S This new approach asserts that the antitrust
laws primarily were enacted to give consumers the right to purchase competitively priced goods. It condemns the use of market
power artificially to raise prices and stresses that the antitrust
laws were designed to prevent wealth transfers from consumers to
firms with market power. Efficiency was also meant to be a concern of antitrust. But the laws' main thrust was to give consumers,
not cartels or monopolies, the fruits of competitive capitalism. 16
Although the wealth transfer view was rejected by most federal enforcement officials during the 1980s,11 many are now starting to embrace it. This idea, moreover, has only been developed
in detail with respect to certain areas of antitrust, such as in articles demonstrating that merger enforcement would be stricter
under a wealth transfer approach than under an efficiency
12 There is little doubt that the government can raise industry costs
in a manner that might have a disparate impact on certain firms.
13
See Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as
the Ruler ofAntitrust, 33 ANrrrRuST BULL. 429, 430-31 (1988).
14

/d. at 432-34.

IS
See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged,
34 HASTINGS LJ. 65 (1982).

16

Lande, supra note 15, passim.

17

See Lande, supra note 13, at 458-63; id. at 438-44.
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approach. 1S The concept could, however, be examined more carefully and implemented more aggressively in the future. Consideration of the transfer effects of market power (in addition to its
efficiency effects) could particularly affect antitrust cases involving price discrimination (including Robinson-Patman cases and
tying cases), horizontal restraint cases that involve a tradeoff
between market power effects and efficiency effects, vertical
restraint cases, and merger analysis. 19
C. Effects of imperfect information

A third enforcement-oriented possibility arises from taking
imperfect information concerns more seriously, pursuant to Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. 20 This decision
is so new that we cannot yet accurately predict its long-term
effects on the antitrust world. We must attempt to grapple with it,
however, because information issues significantly affected the
Court's decision in two places,21 and were an underpinning of
many of its major holdings. 22
18
See Alan A. Fisher et al., Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers,
77 CAL. L. REV. 777 (1988); Alan A Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1580
(1983).

19

See generally Lande, supra note 13, at 463.

20
112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992). This article's Kodak analysis is based
upon Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect Information Could Playa Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANrrrRUST
L.J. 193 (1993).

21 "The first information failure involved customers' inability to
predict future chances in Kodak's policy. Before 1985, potential purchasers of Kodak machines allegedly understood that after purchasing
their machines they could go to an independent service organization
(ISO) for parts and service. Frequently these IS0s, charged significantly
less for service than did Kodak. In 1985 or 1986 Kodak changed its policy and any customer wishing to purchase Kodak's patented spare parts
had to purchase a Kodak service contract as well. Kodak thus instituted
an 'aftertie' between parts and service, effectively eliminating the IS0s.
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If Kodak is interpreted in a narrow fashion it is merely another
important case.23 But if the decision is read very broadly, its
emphasis and reliance upon imperfect information could have dramatic effects on the antitrust world, for three reasons. First, Kodak
holds that anticompetitive concerns can arise despite the absence
of traditional market share-based market power.24 Kodak in effect
holds that there are now two ways to exploit consumers; through
traditional market share-based market power, or through imperfect
information. 2S Imperfect information can substitute for traditional
•.. Kodak's second reliance on information failures involved customers' inability to perform relatively complex life-cycle pricing comparisons. When individual consumers are involved it often is obvious that
information imperfections can prevent purchasers from making optimal
purchasing decisions, but a noteworthy aspect of the decision is that all
of the victimized purchasers in Kodak were businesses. The Court
stressed that, as a factual matter, life-cycle pricing was extremely difficult to perform accurately. Customers would have to perform this calculation for all brands on the market to be able to compare costs intelligently." See Lande, supra note 20, at 174-95 (footnotes omitted).
22
"Customers could be exploited by the aftertie only in an environment of imperfect information. Due to the 'lock-in' factor (the cost that
would be incurred if a customer with a Kodak machine decided to switch
to a new machine) consumers could be exploited by the aftertie. If the
information possessed by customers before 1985 had been perfect, however, they would have anticipated their machines and were locked in to
purchasing spare parts from Kodak. The Court said that this was an unexpected change that consumers of the machines could not reasonably
have anticipated. Competition involving machines, before the machine's
initial purchase, could not have protected these consumers effectively
since Kodak's switch was expected by neither Kodak's customers nor its
competitors. Even if a traditional structural analysis would indicate that
competition in a market should protect consumers, Kodak holds that
firms with small market shares can unfairly harm consumers by taking
advantage of imperfect information." ld. at 194 (footnotes omitted).

23
Kodak's effects will be relatively minor if its precedent value is
limited to cases involving aftermarkets, a major change in corporate policy, significant switching costs, etc.
24

See Lande, supra note 20, at 197; Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2087.

2S
Neil Averitt verbally pointed out to the author an analogy to business torts, which also can cause harm even if they do not involve market
power.
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market share-based market power and can make a market that,
structurally, appears competitive to behave anticompetitively.26
Second, imperfect information can create more narrowly defined
relevant markets because it can effectively prevent customers
from turning to certain potential substitutes. 27 Consumers might
not know of an option's existence or, more likely, that an option is
a cost-effective substitute. If courts define markets more narrowly
this usually will have the effect of making it more likely that a
firm will be found to have market power. 28 Third, businesses, like
individual consumers, can make information-based mistakes that
can allow them to be exploited. Consumer protection law's
assumptions about individuals' capabilities, vulnerabilities and
needs can apply to businesses as well.29
Many specific areas of antitrust law could be affected if
information often is found to be significantly impaired and
these imperfections are found to cause businesses to make decisions that are exploitable through the use of practices that are
of antitrust concern. Among the areas that could be affected are resale price maintenance,3o exclusive dealing arrange26

Lande, supra note 20, at 197.

27
Even though Kodak possessed less than 25% of the photocopier
market the Court focused upon the locked-in customers, of which Kodak
had a 100% market share. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2087.
28
For a discussion and an exception see Lande, supra note 20, at
195; 197.
29
We often assume that certain antitrust offenses are highly improbable in a market where competition is present because potential victims
could simply shift to another supplier. This shift will not occur, however,
if potential victims are unaware of the supracompetitive pricing and the
consequent need to take defensive measures.
30
Professor Warren Grimes recently showed how retailers can use
resale price maintenance to take advantage of consumers' information
inadequacies in a way that causes consumers to be exploited. Resale price
maintenance can be used to guarantee large retail commissions so salespeople will have an incentive to "push" certain brands of products.
Grimes' model hinges on imperfect information by consumers because,
if consumers knew that the only reason why sales clerks were pushing

Beyond chicago

9

ments,31 tying that does not involve an aftertie,32 predatory pricing,33 and practices that potentially violate the Robinson-Patman
Act.3 4
particular brands was so that the sales clerks would get a higher commission, the scheme would not work. Warren S. Grimes, Spit, Polish and
Consumer Demand Quality: Vertical Price Restraints Revisited, 80 CAL.
L. REv. 815, 834-36 (1992).
31
Dr. Gerald Brock's analysis of the Federal Trade Commission
industrial gases cases involved such a situation. The industrial gases market was changing, but manufacturers realized that the change was occurring before their gas distributors realized it. The manufacturers locked
their retailers in with exclusive dealing contracts. The retailers realized
too late that the exclusive dealing arrangements had disadvantaged them
(in a way that harmed competition). Imperfect information (an asymmetry of information because the gas producers knew more about the changing nature of industrial gases market than the retailers) explained the
imposition of the tie. See Gerald Brock, Vertical Restraints in Industrial
Gases, in IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION VERTICAL
REsTRAINT CASES 386 (Ronald N. Lafferty et al., eds., FIC publication
1984) (hereinafter IMPACT EVALUATIONS).

32 Professor Howard Marvel analyzed a technological tie between
hearing aids and batteries and concluded that the purpose of the tie might
well have been to impose price discrimination against heavy users of
hearing aids. Consumers could theoretically have engaged in life-cycle
pricing (they could have calculated the discounted present value of both
the hearing aid and the batteries they were likely to buy). Because consumers were unable as a practical matter to often do this correctly, however, they could be exploited through the tie. See Marvel, Vertical
Restraints in the Hearing Aids Industry in lMPACT EVALUATIONS, supra
note 31, at 271, 328-29.
33
Predatory pricing becomes more plausible if we assume the existence of imperfect information-i.e., if we assume that even businesses
can be fooled or make significant mistakes. If information is perfect, successful predation, including the necessary recoupment of short-term
losses, must be extremely rare. A post-Chicago school view of the world,
based upon the belief that imperfect information is more common, would
conclude that predation is more common. Even old fashioned "deep
pocket" predation can occur, as well as other types, such as "reputation"
predation and "noisy pricing" predation. For example, if pricing and

(footnote 33 continued)
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D. Advances in strategic behavior theory
The fourth possibility concerns the implications of advances in
strategic behavior theory and game theory. This is a category of
ideas that at its broadest includes everything this article has discussed earlier, so two additional relatively specific examples will
be enough to illustrate this area's potential. 35
other terms are as complex as the life-cycle pricing involved in Kodak, a
firm might not realize that predatory pricing was being used against it.
A firm might not take countermeasures because it believed that it was
going bankrupt due to the normal workings of the marketplace. Why
struggle if you believe that the would-be monopolist is more efficient?
See Lande, supra note 20, at 200-01.
34
Violations of the Robinson-Patman Act require price discrimination. Before Kodak, traditionally defined market share-based market
power probably was a prerequisite for illegal price discrimination. Imperfect information, however, can also permit price discrimination to occur
because a firm might not know how much it actually pays for its purchases. Kodak holds that a business might not know how much it effectively pays for a product over its life cycle, and similar pricing complexities can arise after credit terms, advertising allowances, return policy,
service terms, special promotions, and the like are considered. These
complications also can make it especially difficult for a company to compare how much it pays with the prices that its competitors pay. Moreover,
a company is more likely to provide a discount only to some of its customers when information imperfections make it less likely that other
customers will discover these discounts. Thus, imperfect information
could, in a Robinson-Patman setting, be a substitute for a traditional market share-based market power and provide the motive and cover for illegal price discrimination. See Lande, supra note 20, at 200-01.

35
For an excellent analysis of much of the field see Dennis A. Yao
& Susan S. DeSanti, Game Theory and the Legal Analysis of Tacit Collusion, 38 ANn1'RUST BULL. 113 (1993). A recent article also wonderfully
illustrates how game theory and strategic interaction models can be
applied in an antitrust setting. See Joseph F. Brodley & Ching-to Albert
Ma, Contract Penalties, Monopolizing Strategies, and Antitrust Policy,
45 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1993). The authors apply a model developed by
Aghion and Boulton to show how a monopolist can use a contract penalty
clause as a strategic mechanism that enhances its monopoly power. "The
penalty clause binds the monopolist and its customers in a coalition that
wields monopoly buying power against potential entrants. The penalty
forces an entrant to pay a penalty, through lower prices, in order to solicit

Beyond chicago : 11

The first concerns how rent-seeking behavior could lead to
antitrust issues. Rent-seeking is a relatively old concept that is
usually discussed by "conservative" scholars. 36 But consider its
application in a franchisor/franchisee context. 37 Once a franchise
contract is signed both parties often are locked in to some degree.
Assume, consistent with Kodak, that there is imperfect information at the time of the signing of the franchise agreement and that
some franchisees do not really understand what they are signing.
As time passes rents might accrue due to the efforts of the franchisee-perhaps the franchise accumulates goodwill that is
largely attributable to the franchisee's efforts. The franchisor
could engage in rent-seeking behavior using tying arrangements
or other vertical restraints to acquire this goodwill.38 Absent
imperfect information this rent extraction would not be a concern
for no franchisee would sign a franchise arrangement that would
enable the franchisor unfairly to extract its goodwill. But if, consistent with Kodak, we posit imperfect information at the time of
the franchise contracts' signing, this kind of scenario might
become an antitrust concern. Could the contracts that contained
the "unfair" tying arrangements or other vertical restraints constitute antitrust violations? Other restraints also could be analyzed as
rent-seeking devices. 39
The second example involves the use of the 5% test to help
define markets. The 1984 U.S. Department of Justice Horizontal
customers from the monopolist." The authors show how this deprives the
entrant of part or all of its expected return which will, in some cases,
deter entry. [d. at 1163.
36
See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975); RICHARD
.AN ECONOMIC PERSPECITVE 11-12 (1976).

POSNER, ANrrrRUST

LAw:

This example is taken from Lande, supra note 20, at 200.
3B
For example, a pizza franchise contract could require that pizza
franchisees purchase all their supplies from the franchisor at a supracompetitive price. This could constitute effective price discrimination
against successful franchisees.
37

39

See the discussion of exclusive dealing, supra note 31.
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Merger Guidelines asked whether new firms would be likely to
enter a market if prices rose by a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price (such as 5%).40 This standard can be
criticized as being too ready to accept the possibility of entry
because the potential entrants' addition of capacity to the market
could depress prices, and prospective entrants would be unlikely
to enter unless they were reasonably sure that prices would stay at
a supracompetitive level for a long enough period for the firms to
recover sunk costs. While this ambiguity was a problem in the
1984 Guidelines, the 1992 Merger Guidelines explicitly take these
strategic considerations into account.41 The new formulation is
accordingly more skeptical toward claims of easy entry.

II. Changes in antitrust's overall environment that could
contribute to a renaissance
In addition to the theoretical advances discussed above, there
have also been changes to antitrust's overall environment that
could be conducive to a reinvigoration of the field. These new
conditions include (A) the reemergence of the states as aggressive
enforcers, (B) increased criminal penalties, (C) narrower antitrust
exemptions and, (D) increasing sophistication of plaintiffs'
counsel.

A. The reemergence42 of the states as aggressive enforcers
The state enforcers had their most dramatic effects on the
antitrust world during the 1980s in the merger area, perhaps
40
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Merger Guidelines, 49
Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984), reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 655,
~~ 4490-4495 at § 3.3 (June 18, 1984).
41
See 1992 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) (Special Supp., Apri12, 1992).
42
"Reemergence" is a more accurate description than "emergence"
because in the early years of antitrust the states often successfully challenged large national transgressors. For an excellent analysis see James

Beyond chicago : 13

because federal enforcement diminished considerably during this
period, thus creating what many considered to be an unfortunate
void. During the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s no state appears to have
filed a merger case. 43 Two were filed during the 1960s and another
two during the 1970s.44 During the 1980s the states collectively or
individually filed twenty-nine merger cases and another sixteen
amicus briefs or interventions. 4s During 1988, moreover, the states
collectively filed more merger cases than the U.S. Department of
Justice's Antitrust Division. 46 Many of these cases involved
extremely large transactions. 47 There is no reason to believe that
the states will return to their former nearly dormant status in the
merger area or in other areas,48 so the states' continued efforts will
be a contributing factor to any coming antitrust renaissance.

May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135
U. PA. L. REv. 495, 499-502 (1987). During the first 20 years of the
Sherman Act the Department of Justice Antitrust Division was responsible for a total of $219,000 in antitrust fines. Id. at 502. During this period
one suit by the State of Texas alone resulted in a fine of more than $1.6
million against the Standard Oil Co. Id.
43
See Robert H. Lande, When Should States Challenge Mergers:
A Proposed Federal/State Balance, 35 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 1047 (1990).
44

Id. at 1055 nn.44-45.

4S

/d. at 1056 nn.46-47.

46

Id. at 1060 n.48.

47
See, e.g., California v. American Stores, 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990);
State ex reI. Van de Camp v. Texaco, Inc., 223 Cal. Rptr. 266, 713 P.2d
1196 (Cal. 1986), aff'd, 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 68,288,46 Cal. 3d
1147, 252 Cal. Rptr. 221, 762 P.2d 385 (1988) (proposed Texaco-Getty
merger).
48
See Richard Blumenthal et aI., Antitrust Review of Mergers by
State Attorneys General: The New Cops on the Beat, 67 CoNN. BJ. 1, 14
(1993).
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B. Increased criminal penalties

Criminal antitrust penalties have increased in recent years. In
the past, prison sentences were rarely significant,49 and were not
frequent or long enough to constitute a serious deterrent against
antitrust violations. There were entire years in the 1960s (and
even one in the 1970s) when no one spent any time at all in prison
for an antitrust offense!50 Fines also were trivia1.51 Even before the
United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines went into effect
on November 1, 1987~ however, criminal penalties (whether
measured in terms of jail time or fines) increased, as did the percentage of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division budget
allocated to criminal enforcement. 52 After the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines became effective, penalties
49
There have, of course, been such exceptions as the electrical
equipment conspiracy cases. See Joseph C. Gallo et al., Penalties Under
the Sherman Act: A Study of Law and Economics (draft 1992).

50

ld. at 43-44.

51

ld. at 40-41.

52
See Charles F. Rule, Deterring Antitrust Crimes Through Stiffer
Penalties, ALI-ABA Antitrust Seminar, San Francisco, CA (May 6,
1988). As Professor William Kovacic notes, "The Reagan and Bush
administrations initiated unprecedented numbers of grand jury proceedings, resorted more frequently to little-used investigation techniques such
as wire-tapping and electronic surveillance, broadened cooperation with
other law enforcement entities and government bureaus (particularly public purchasing officials), and increasingly invoked non-antitrust statutes
dealing with mail and wire fraud, false statements to government agencies, false claims for payment by the government, and perjury to prosecute apparent episodes of misconduct. . • . [In addition,] over the past
decade, Congress has raised the maximum Sherman Act fine for individuals to $350,000 and for corporations to $10 million and has increased
the maximum prison term for individuals to 3 years. Congress also established an alternative fine scheme that enables the government to collect
an antitrust fine equal to double the harm suffered by victims of illegal
conduct or double the gain realized by the defendant. A separate measure
authorized the federal government to obtain treble damages for injuries
suffered in its capacity as a purchaser." William E. Kovacic, The Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agreements Under the Antitrust Laws, 38
ANrrrRUST BULL. 5,10-12 (1993) (citations omitted).
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became even more severe,53 so criminal antitrust sanctions now
are more of a deterrence against anticompetitive conduct.
C. Narrower exemptions

Antitrust now is broader because many of its exemptions are
more narrow. In 1976 the professions were practically exempt
from the antitrust laws. By that year few cases in the area had
been filed,54 but this "exemption" has of course greatly eroded
since then. 55 The state action exemption has also narrowed,56 and
even the insurance exemption might be far narrower than many
recently believed. 57 Antitrust now reaches a greater percentage of
our economy; another reason for optimism and revival.

53
Gallo et ai. document an increase in penalties from 1976 through
1992 that is in many respects more than by a factor of 10. See Gallo et
aI., supra note 49, at 48-49 & 69-70.
54
For an early example see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975) (holding that a minimum fee schedule promulgated by a professional association can violate § 1 of the Sherman Act).

55
See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust & Sports: Must Competition
on the Field Displace Competition in the Marketplace, 60 TENN. L. REv.
263 (1993); Neil P. Motenko, Health Care Developments, 64 AmrrRUST
LJ. 639 (1991); Phillip C. Kissom et aI., Antitrust and Hospital Privileges; Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CAL. L. REv. 595 (1982);
Dennis R. Bartholomew, Antitrust and the Professions: Where Do We Go
From Here?, 29 VaL. L. REv. 115 (1983); Phillip C. Kissom, Antitrust
Law and Professional Behavior, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1983).
56
1976 was, of course, before such crucial decisions as California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980) (holding that immunity arises only if a state actively supervises
the activity); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455
U.S. 40 (1982) (holding that a general home rule statute does not satisfy
the requirement that the delegation of power must be clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed).
57
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993)
(defendants' alleged activities held to constitute a boycott and therefore
not exempt from the antitrust laws).
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D. Increasingly sophisticated plaintiffs' lawyers

Today plaintiff lawyers might, on the whole, be more sophisticated economically than they were a generation ago. We are all, to
a large extent, only as sophisticated as we need to be.58 Before
decisions like Sylvania 59 in 1977 and Broadcast Music Inc. 60 in
1979, plaintiff lawyers did not usually need to utilize sophisticated economic arguments. They often were not "state of the art"
in this regard. But they have by now adjusted. 61 There are many
examples of excellent plaintiff lawyers who utilize sophisticated
economic theories to achieve victories for their clients. 62 Aggressive, innovative plaintiff lawyers are the necessary bridge between
the theoreticians and reality.63

58
By analogy, giraffes evolved long necks to reach relatively high
branches. They extended their necks only as much as was required to
reach the appropriate branches. They did not evolve necks longer than
those needed for survival.
59

G1E Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T.V. Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).

60
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441
U.S. 1 (1979).

61
For example, in 1982, when the Herfindahl index was introduced
to the antitrust world through its inclusion in that year's Merger Guidelines, the antitrust bar was at first shocked at the prospect of having to
square market shares. It quickly adjusted. After a very short period
antitrust lawyers and their clients discussed Herfindahls as if they had
been using them all of their lives.
62
See, e.g., Kodak, supra note 20, Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,
supra note 57, and Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951
(10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990).

63
Another example of forward-looking thinking by a sophisticated
antitrust lawyer was the sponsorship by Frederick Furth (and others) of a
conference designed to produce scholarship that might be helpful to those
who believe in vigorous antitrust enforcement. See Eleanor M. Fox &
Robert Pitofsky, Airlie House Conference on the Antitrust Alternative:
Introduction, 76 GEO. LJ. 237 (1987).
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III. Factors that will make an antitrust renaissance
less likely
Before anyone concludes that an antitrust counterrevolution is
imminent, however, a number of powerful factors must be considered. Each will make an antitrust resurgence less likely to
occur. Each will tend to minimize or counteract the effects of the
earlier lists of new ideas and changes in antitrust's overall environment.
First, government enforcement resources have declined significantly while the Republicans have been in office. 64 For example,
during fiscal year 1980 there were 1719 employees at the Federal
Trade Commission. 65 During fiscal year 1992 there were only
964,66 and no significant increases seem likely.67 While the state
antitrust enforcers have become more aggressive during this
period, there are less than one hundred of them in total, and much
of their time is, of necessity, consumed by relatively local pricefixing cases. They have limited time and resources for path-breaking antitrust theories or cases, and are too few in number to offset
the decreases in federal enforcement resources.
Second, the federal judiciary is increasingly conservative. Professor William Kovacic notes that approximately two-thirds of
federal judges are Reagan or Bush appointees, and Professor
64
Moreover, the federal government must of necessity spend a substantial amount of its current resources on price fixing and mergers, leaving relatively few resources for other areas.
65
See Federal Trade Commission, Fiscal Year 1994 Program Budget
as Submitted to Congress, March 16, 1993, at 11.

66
!d. It seems likely, however, that the enforcers are in many ways
more efficient than they were in 1980. New technology, for example,
such as voice mail and PCs for almost every attorney, enables the
enforcers to have a higher ratio of lawyers to secretaries. The overall
downward trend presented in the text therefore probably overstates the
true diminution in the enforcers' litigation capacity.
67
The current number of Federal Trade Commission employees is
expected to shrink slightly. Supra note 65.
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Kovacic persuasively demonstrates that few are aggressive or liberal in their antitrust decision making. 68 A surprising finding of
Professor Kovacic's research, moreover, is that many judges
appointed by Democrats also are quite conservative. 69 There are
few equivalents of a Learned Hand on the federal bench today
who will readily embrace the more innovative theories discussed
earlier in this article.
The third factor is the rise of the rule of reason since 1977.
This has led to additional costs and delays for plaintiffs and has
greatly benefited defendants. Now, for example, nonprice vertical
restraints are judged under the rule of reason. 70 Consider even the
state of tying analysis after the Kodak decision. While this was an
important plaintiff victory, the holding was in many respects narrow.71 Tying cases continue to be adjudicated under a per se standard virtually identical to the rule of reason.72 All the plaintiff in
Kodak won was the right to spend years in discovery and hundreds of thousands of dollars in litigation costs to get a chance to
prove a large number of difficult issues under, essentially, a rule
of reason. Because rule of reason cases are more costly and time
consuming, and victory is less likely than under the per se standard, fewer cases are being filed.

68
For an excellent analysis see William E. Kovacic, Judicial Appointments and the Future of Antitrust Policy, 7 ANrrrRUST 8, 11 (1993) [hereinafter Judicial Appointments]; William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial
Appointees and Antitrust in the 1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 49 (1991).

69

Kovacic, JudicialAppointments, supra note 68, at 9.

70

See Sylvania, supra note 59.

71
Kodak only directly applies to cases involving tying in aftermarkets, where the defendant made a major change in corporate policy,
where information in the market is significantly impaired, and where
plaintiff is locked into using defendant's products due to high switching
costs. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2087-88; Lande, supra note 20, at 198 n.17.
72
See Jefferson Parish Hospital District No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2
(1984).
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A fourth factor is the rise of international competition. 73 Markets have become more international in the last 15 years as
exports and imports have increased significantly.74 This means
that market power is less common, markets are often defined more
broadly, and entry into many markets is more likely to be judged
to be easy. Although many markets were international in 1977,
this difference in degree also means there is now less need for
antitrust in large sectors of the American economy.
Fifth, standing has also become tougher for plaintiffs since
1976. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 7S and cases
that followed in its wake made it more difficult for plaintiffs to
show that they suffered the types of injuries that are the concern
of the antitrust.76 Illinois Brick v. Illinois,77 moreover, which holds
that only direct purchasers have standing to sue for damages,
means that indirect purchasers, including most consumers, are
unable to successfully receive compensation for antitrust injuries.
Together these cases effectively shielded many wrongdoers and
their overcharges from antitrust scrutiny.
Sixth, much of the Chicago school "new learning" is now an
accepted, even core part of antitrust. 78 We all now have greater
73
See, e.g., Symposium on Antitrust and International Competitiveness in the 1990s, 58 ANTrrRUST L.J. 515 (1989).
74
See National Economic Strategies for a Global Economy: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 19,
21 (1992) (statement of Robert Pitofsky that imports into the United
States have increased by $450 billion since 1970).

7S 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (holding that to recover treble damages under
§ 4 of the Clayton Act, a plaintiff must prove an injury that is of the type
that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent, an injury flowing from
that which makes the defendant's acts unlawful).
76
See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S.
328,334 (1990); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104,
109 (1986); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557,
562 (1981).

77

431 U.S. 720 (1977).

78
For an excellent analysis see William E. Kovacic, Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the Reagan Administration: Two Cheers for the Dis-
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appreciation for the needs of business and the desirability of corporate growth and efficiency.79 These relatively conservative
pro defendant insights also will make a counterrevolution less
likely.
Finally, there are two other aspects of antitrust that were
unduly advantageous for violators in the 1970s and remain so
today. First, criminal penalties are still too low. While they are
significantly higher than in 1970s,80 an incisive paper by Professor Joseph Gallo et aI., employing a standard optimal deterrence
model and reasonable assumptions81 shows that criminal antitrust
penalties are even now only a fraction of those needed to obtain
optimal deterrence. 82 These results show that the present combination of fines and prison sentences continue to significantly underdeter antitrust crimes.83 Second, civil antitrust damages are too
low, from either a deterrence or compensation prospective.84 Professor William Landes showed in 1983 that optimal antitrust damages should consist of "net harm to others," multiplied to account
for detection and proof problems. 8S The lack of prejudgment interest alone, however, probably lowers the nominal trebling multiappearance of the Large Firm Defendant in N onmerger Cases, 12 REs. L.
& EeoN. 173,178-82 (1989), and the sources cited therein.
79
To believe today, for example, that vertical restraints are often
used for procompetitive reasons does not identify one as a Chicagoist,
although in 1976 it might have.

80

See the discussion supra section U(B).

81
Their assumptions include a 15% chance of detection and conviction, a 10% price markup, and that 1 year in prison is (dis)valued at
$1,000,000. See Gallo et aI., supra note 49, at 63-70.
82

ld.

83

ld. They find the current penalties to be only 5% of their optimal

level.
84
See Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really
Single Damages?, 54 Omo ST. L.J.115 (1993).

as William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations,
50 U. Cm. L. REv. 652 (1983).
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plier down to less than the twofold leve1. 86 When other factors,
including the statute of limitations, allocative inefficiency effects
of market power, uncompensated corporate time pursuing the
case, and costs to the judicial system are considered, awarded
antitrust damages are probably only between .5 and 1.1 times as
large as actual damages. 87 Because awarded damages should be
significantly larger than actual damages to compensate for detection and proof problems,88 currently awarded antitrust damages
are, on the average, significantly low. They are probably too low
from either an optimal deterrence or a compensation perspective. 89
The eight factors listed in this section help to explain why the
number of antitrust cases has plummeted dramatically since the
Democrats were last in office. In 1979, 1234 civil antitrust cases
were filed. 90 In 1992 only 502 were filed.91

IV. Conclusions
We cannot reasonably expect a significant antitrust counterrevolution in the near future. Despite the apparent promise of the
"proplaintiff' theories listed in section I, each is extremely difficult to prove and might never move from theory to commonplace
reality.92 The tantalizing possibilities suggested by the factors in
86

Lande, supra note 84, at 130-36.

87

Id. at 159 (this range utilizes Landes' optimal deterrence frame-

work).
88

Id. at 171.

89

Id. at 161-68.

90

Id. at 146 n.148.

91
See L. RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CoURTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, .ANNuAL
REPORT OF THE DIREcrOR, table C-2A, at 182 (1992).

92
For example, a court could reject the use of imperfect information
to invalidate a franchise contract, suggested in note 38, supra. The court
could reason that information is always somewhat imperfect and if these
clauses sometimes were invalidated, there would be insufficient business
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sections I and II must, moreover, be considered in light of the
anti-antitrust tide outlined in section III. The net of these factors
suggests that there might at most be a few areas where the number
of cases will increase on the margin. Enforcers will be unlikely to
specifically attempt to find, for example, a situation where vertical restraints are used to raise rivals' costs in a manner that results
in an unfair wealth transfer from consumers to firms with market
power. It is much more likely that they will carefully examine
selected transactions and areas of the economy, especially those
with heightened national interest,93 and in this way cases will
arise.
Merger enforcement, for example, will not in any respect
return to anything even close to a Von's Grocery94 standard. 95
Nevertheless, when Kevin Arquit finished serving as Director of
the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission in
1992, he noted that he was successful in thirty-seven of thirtynine mergers that he challenged.96 When James Rill resigned as
head of the Antitrust Division in 1992, he noted that he was successful in forty-five out of forty-nine merger challenges.97 These
statistics imply that if the enforcers had been willing to lower
their "batting average" somewhat they perhaps could have been
successful at stopping additional corporate mergers. Federal Trade
Commission statistics for merger challenges made between 1987
certainty regarding the validity of franchise contracts, and that this lack
of certainty could prevent people from signing franchise contracts.

93 Health care will continue to be important, for example, and the
downsizing of the defense sector should also give rise to heightened
interest by the enforcers in this area.
94

United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).

9S
Even if new federal enforcers desire this outcome, federal judges
would not allow it to happen.
96
See Arquit to Leave FTC for New York Firm, 63 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. 507 (Nov. 22,1992) (these figures include consent orders).
97
See [Charles] James Outlines "Good Govt Initiatives," FTC:
Watch, No. 377, at 13 (Nov. 9, 1992) (these figures include consent
orders).

Beyond chicago : 23

and 1992 also suggest that the Commission could have been
somewhat more aggressive. 98 Out of sixty-one challenged mergers, only one involved a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)
change of less than 300, and only three others involved an HHI
change of between 300 and 400. 99 Only one challenge was to a
merger that resulted in an HHI level of less than 2000, and only
seven others were to mergers that would have resulted in HHIs of
less than 2500.1 00 These statistics suggest that more aggressive
merger enforcement, challenges that often might have been
upheld by the federal courts, could have been possible.
Vertical restraint enforcement could also have been somewhat
more aggressive, as could Robinson-Patman Act enforcement.
Good cases in these areas are extremely difficult to find, however,
and it would be surprising if the new enforcers were able to find
more than one or two good ones in each area per year. Section 2
of the Sherman Act could also be enforced more aggressively, but
, an incisive article by Professor William Kovacic persuasively
shows that, with disappointingly few exceptions, the government
is unable to win section 2 cases. IOI
98
The following statistics were cleared for release by the Federal
Trade Commission's General Counsel, in aggregated form, under Commission Rule S.12(c), 16 C.F.R. S.12(c). The analysis and conclusions
presented herein are those of the author and do not purport to represent
the views of the Commission, of any individual Commissioner, or the
official position of a Commission Bureau. They cover the period January
1987 through June 1992.
99
Four others also involved an HHI change of less than SOO.
(Bureau of Competition estimates are used.)
100

Five others also involved a challenge to an HHI level between

2S00 and 3000. (Bureau of Competition estimates are used).
101
See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 184-92; see also William E.
Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future
of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REv. 110S
(1989). The government is particularly incapable of achieving significant
divestiture, so the enforcers would be advised to choose § 2 cases where
injunctive relief alone would be an adequate remedy. Id., especially at
110S-06.
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Additional antitrust guidelines might be another promising
project for the new antitrust enforcers. Vertical restraints guidelines that were perceived as being ideologically mainstream could
certainly be usefu1. 102 Predatory pricing could be another suitable
area, as might the Robinson-Patman Act, vertical mergers, and
tying.
Another possible area for change involves federal-state cooperation. Federal-state friction was high during much of the Reagan administration, but relations improved considerably during
the Bush administration.l°3 This relationship could improve even
more during a Democratic administration. There is no compelling
reason why the current federal and state merger guidelines could
not be combined into one mutually agreed upon document. If the
state and federal enforcers continue to work together and develop
mutual respect and trust, this achievement should be possible.
Moreover, the federal and state enforcers might even be able to
achieve a division of primary authority for merger enforcement. 104
Similar federal-state cooperation could result in other jointly
issued guidelines and perhaps also in jointly filed cases.
The thrust of this article has been to assemble and outline
many of the significant factors that suggest that an antitrust counterrevolution could materialize, but then to sketch some of the
opposing reasons and to predict that these tendencies largely will
offset one another. This prediction must be tempered, however, by
its uncertainty. Few antitrust analysts, for example, could have
correctly predicted the Supreme Court's Kodak decision, either its
102
The Department of Justice Vertical Restraints Guidelines were
believed by many not to have been an ideologically neutral document.
See Fisher et al., supra note 18, at 632.
103

See Lande, supra note 43, at 1052-60; 1066-69 & 1090-91.

104
See id. The European Community recently negotiated just such a
division, determining that certain mergers should be challenged only by
the Community, others only by individual nation states, and that still
other mergers can be challenged at either level. Id. at 1075-80. If independent nations can work out a division of primary responsibility, our
federal and state enforcers also should be able to do so.
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result or its reasoning. lOS Nor is there much certainty concerning
the priorities or predispositions of those who will head the
antitrust enforcement agencies or will be appointed to the federal
bench. Nevertheless, even an optimistic prediction suggests that
the most that can be hoped for is the end of antitrust's long
decline with modest increases in a few areas.

lOS
A comparison of two recent cases illustrates the uncertainty involved
and the difficulty of making predictions in the area. Carnival Cruise
Lines Inc. v. State, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991), written by Justice Blackmun
(the author of the Kodak opinion), suggests a relatively small role for
imperfect information. A clause designing the forum to be used to resolve
disputes was upheld despite a lack of relevant information by plaintiffs at
the time they signed the contract. By contrast, use of the expansive view
of the effects of imperfect information contained in Kodak, issued only a
year later, probably would have resulted in a victory for the plaintiffs in
Carnival Cruise Lines.

